World cup tactical ramble: Using two holding midfielders
One of the main debates during the world cup was the annoying trend of using double pivots. It sounded like a sin or a disgraceful behavior. While Holland fans considered it as an ugly compromise aiming to bring the world cup home, it was an unacceptable idea for teams like Brazil and Spain.
While analyzing a system, one of the common flaws is to focus on tactical notations more than system functionality. That leads to some football stereotypes that sounds like a given: Three players in defense are less reliable than four. Two holding midfielders is less offense oriented than one. And so on…
The team that impressed the majority of world cup followers was Germany. If we use absolute tactical terminologies, they were playing two holding midfielders. But the flair was there so as the scoring potentials. Because none of the two players, Khedira and Schweinsteiger was as static as the notations might reflect. Khedira was more a Pivot assistant/box2box midfielder, as long as the match scheme permits.
Brazil’s usage of two holding midfielders was heavily criticized. Dunga is a flop in the eyes of football analysts. But if it wasn’t of Melo’s stunning performance for Holland against Brazil, who knows? Maybe Dunga would have been labeled as the new Zagallo.
As I always repeat: The coach is the hostage of his own results. Dunga made lot of mess (especially with some substitutions). Yet, the two holding midfielders Dunga used served the offense fire as much as it created a stability for the defense (The coach can’t control things enough to prevent his player to score an own goal then earn himself a suspension). It’s always important to keep the midfield area under control, especially for this Brazil where you can’t count on a Ronaldo or a Ronaldinho to create chaos and decide the game. When the team lost possession they had two holding midfielders but while set offense they had only one: Melo. Gilberto was a third center back who released the two fullbacks to attack with no concerns. As an aftermath analysis one player was sacrificed for more defense duties released two players to contribute in the offense without hesitation. It was almost impossible for Brazil to use one holding midfielder with the kind of fullbacks they have –especially on the left. Keep in mind that the structure was not Dunga’s innovation. Brazil 1994 had Mouro Silva and Dunga in the final. Brazil 1998 had Sampaio and Dunga in the final. Brazil 2002 had Gilberto Silva and Edmilson in the final. In 2006 with Ze Roberto being less-disciplined beside Silva, they failed in the quarterfinal regardless of having all the superstars you may wish.
Moving to Spain, I will try to keep focused on the holding midfielder detail because there is a plan to write a post about Spain in the world cup. Before evaluating the success of two holding midfielders for Spain it’s important to question the certain: Were Xabi and Busquets playing as two holding midfielders?
Technically, yes. But if we dive more in depth, those two were the best demonstration about how far the functionality can upgrade the standard position and role of a player. While Xabi was a mix of Khadira’s (Germany) Box2box/pivot assistant, Busquets was by far the performer of the world cup. He was a Gilberto and a Melo (as a position not as a performance) at the same time, two in one. And he added the normal deep lying play-maker touch you can expect from Barcelona’s graduates. No wonder that with Busquets and Xabi behind and Iniesta in front, Xavi was able to go and do some shopping while the match is taking place and return without notice. Was this the best system for Spain? That’s another discussion. But the Busquets-Xabi partnership not only helped releasing the fullbacks to attack but also closed the midfield and buried any opportunity for counter attacks.
Holland system was the most primitive one of them all. No doubt van Marwijk will get his share of the praise because he reached the final, but the positioning and functionality of his players was too static to earn any credit. It was simple: close-down the defense and throw the ball forward for the skillful ones to make the difference. There is a difference between change and innovation. He changed the team tactics no doubt, but it’s safe to say there was no innovation at all. I dare to believe that reaching the final was absolute luck.
No doubt there were other teams applying this structure, but it is safe to say that the mentioned nations were the ones who received most of the sticks as a price for believing in it.



Hmm.. In Germany's system Schweinsteiger has gone home with most of the credit and for his preformances, he certainly deserved it. But Khedira's role has been neglected by most analysts. Playing as a Box-to-Box mid Khedira seemed to be doing the most running in the German team. His runs opened up space for Muller and Ózil and was the invisible factor in many of the German goals.
Busquets stayed central, showed great positioning. Pique covered the right flank while Ramos surged upfield. Xabi Alonso didn't have too far to move forward (unlike Khedira) since Spain had so much possession just in front of the opposition defense. He seemed a foil to Xavi in that Xavi concentrates possession in small triangles while Alonso distributes it wide.
I have always considered Del Bosque one of the most intelligent coaches. I am not sure too many others can win the Champions League with just Redondo and Raul. Also remember him outsmarting Omar Hitzfeld by changing Real's gameplan to an Arsenal style through ball to Anelka mode against Bayern. Hitzfeld got his back this time though.
Yeah, I was watching the final. People next to me were screaming for Torres. I could see that the only person he could take off for Torres was Villa and thats why he waited so long. I felt Torres should have started that game rather than Pedro. Pedro was awesome against Germany (hehe, I kept screaming Pedrito, Don Andres, untill the Spanish fans looked around at me and said "Hey, this guy is a Barça fan") but the Dutch CBs aren't as good as the Germans and Torres may have done a better job pulling them out of position than Pedro. Then the Navas substitution might have worked better.